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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has gained significant weight over the past decade as the tool 
for accelerating growth and development of economies in transition. Since opening up their 
economic system in 1978, China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
with an average annual GDP growth of more than 9% (World Bank, The (2011a)). By 
opening up the country’s economy, China has in recent years become one of the largest 
recipients of FDI in the world while their share of Outward Direct investments (ODI) has 
been quite small (Cheng, L. K., & Ma, Z. (2010)). 
  
After the start of the economic transformation, China continued to maintained control on 
financial outflow. In the following years of opening up the economy the ODI flows were 
practically zero. In the 1990s and until 2004 the annual ODI flows in China were only around 
$2 billion. Although, in recent years Chinese investors has been increasing their influence on 
the global economy in terms of providing loans, ODI´s and other financial activities. Chinas 
ODI have been increasing in recent years from $19,3 billion in 2000 up to $57,8 billion in 
2010 (Cheng & Ma, 2008).  Even though Chinas share in the total global ODI flow is quite 
small, their share have been increasing from less than 1% in 2007 up to around 5% in 2010. In 
2010, China ranked as the world’s fifth biggest outward investor after the US, Germany, 
France and Hong Kong (Hanemann, T. and Rosen, D.H. (2012)).With Chinas increasing in 
international reserves and trade surplus, they are expected to be the main factor as a provider 
in the international capital market in the future (Cheung & Qian, 2009). Chinas ODI are 
mainly faced towards other countries in Asia as well as developing countries in Africa, 
although in recent years their investments towards other parts of the world have been 
increasing. The Chinese ODI to Africa are mainly focused on natural resources as the demand 
for those has increased in recent years followed by the country’s economic growth. Followed 
by this, China has in recent years become one of the world’s largest importers of oil (Taylor, 
I. (2009)). 
 
Buckley et al (2007) finds that Chinese ODI is attracted to countries with bad institutions 
(high political risk), while Cheung and Qian (2008) find no significant effect of institutions in 
determination of investing location. China’s importance as a source of capital is even greater 
for certain industries, and for the countries and regions that rely on these industries. Chinese 
firms are now major players in global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in many extractive 
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industries, from oil and gas to iron ore, copper and other metals. For some resource-rich 
economies, China is the largest source of ODI. This is often in those countries that are often 
considered to have high political risk (Hanemann, T. and Rosen, D.H. (2012)). Chinese ODI 
is now maturing and evolving, seeking not just natural resources but operating platforms, 
brands and technology in developed economies. Chinese investments in the US have grown 
steeply since 2007, targeting a broad range of sectors and states. High profile deals 
demonstrate that Chinese firms are making similar inroads in Europe (Clegg, J., & Voss, H. 
(2012)). 
 
With this enormous amount in foreign reserves and increasing economic clout, China is able 
to send numerous firms abroad to acquire technologies, brands, resources, and better access to 
international markets. In some industries at least, rising capacity and rising domestic price 
competition are cutting profit margins, and Chinese managers see ODI as a way to upgrade 
technology and increase their earnings. While these are all valid strategies under broad ranges 
of circumstances, it is important to identify specific drivers of the current flow in Chinese 
ODIs, and to estimate its broader implications with economic theories.  
 
China has in recent years been increasing their share of investments within the European 
Union (EU). By investing in the EU, Chinese firms are focusing on gain access to foreign 
markets, technologies and factors of production. The economic crises in Europe have given 
Chinese investors enlarger opportunities to enter the European market than before. Chinese 
investments have increased from less than $1 billion in 2000 up to around $12 billion in 2010 
(MOFCOM, 2010). The reason for these remarkable increases in investments within the EU in 
the recent years is therefore interesting to look at. Why has Chinese firms been increasing 
their share of investments into the EU in recent years? The determinants of those investments 
are complexes and exciting to follow. Given the theoretical ODI structure, firms investing 
aboard are mainly focusing on three main factors, natural resources, increased market share 
and more efficiency driven business. The reason for Chinese investments in other Asian 
countries as well as in Africa has been the focus in many empirical studies in the past. The 
question this study is focusing on is the determinants of Chinese investments within EU 
countries. While Chinese investments into developing countries have often been linked with 
natural resources the determinations of investments into the EU might be concentrated to 
other factors. As studies have shown the determinants for investing in developed economies 
are often connected with gaining access to foreign markets, technologies and certain factors of 
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production. In this study different variables will be used to control for those different 
motivations for investments.  
This paper is organized as followed. In the next section the historical overview of Chinese 
ODIs will be introduced and their investments in the EU. Followed by this, the theoretical 
framework will be presented in chapter 2, included previous studies within this area as well as 
the hypothesis of the study. In the third chapter the methodology of the study will be 
introduced. This includes the model specification and the description of relevant variables. 
Finally, the results will be presented in chapter 4 and the study will be concluded in the final 
chapter.  
 
1.1. Historical overview – The Going global policy 
 
Although China opened up their economy, their ODI did not establish until some years after 
the open door policy. The Chinese ODI has gone through four different stages of development 
since the transformation in 1978. The first stage, starting in 1978 until 1985 is the period 
where only state-owned companies, as well as provincial and municipal economic enterprises, 
were able to invest overseas. At this time only 189 investments projects were approved with 
the total investment amounting to just about $197 million. The second period from 1886 until 
1991 is where the Chinese government began gradual liberalization to allow a wider range of 
firms to invest overseas, including non-state owned enterprises. With these actions from the 
government, ODI from Chinese firms went up to 891 approved projects with the amounting 
of $1.2 billion. The third period from 1992 until 1998 experienced both success as well as 
disappointment. With the liberalization reforms firms began to invest overseas mostly within 
Asia. As the financial crises stuck the area in 1997 many countries suffered from serious 
losses due to institutional weakness, corruption, and lack of management expertise. This 
affected the ODI from China where the China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) tightened approval procedures, and monitored any overseas venture 
of over $1 million. As a result of this, ODI activities slowed down but still increased by $1.2 
billion in total investment. The fourth period and Chinas current stage of ODI began in 1999.  
At this time important legislation was enacted to aid foreign investment (Salidjanova, 2011). 
In the tenth Five- Year plan in 2001 the Chinese government introduced the Go global 
(zouchuqu) policy. In the sixth national congress of the China Communist Party in 2002, 
President Jiang Zeming stated the go overseas policy. The Going global policy is related with 
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FDI, the undertaking of foreign construction and engineering projects, and the export of 
Chinese employment. (Cheng and Ma, 2008). In 2004 another change in the ODI policy was 
made. The government pronounced their roles of, in addition to approving applications, 
supervising and providing services. With these changes Chinese enterprises are now more and 
more aggressive in the international capital market. The Chinese ODIs are brought under this 
attention following some recent attempts to secure natural resources in developing countries 
and large-scale acquisition activities in developed countries (Cheung & Qian, 2009). 
The increase in Chinese ODI flows followed by the Going global policy were significant and 
grew from around $2,7 billion in 2002 up to $68,81 billion already in 2010 (Figure 1). An 
additional boost for the Chinese ODI´s started with the world economic crises in 2007. In the 
year of 2010 the total value of Chinese ODI were up to $68,81 billion (mofcom.gov.cn) 
Despite this remarkable increase in ODI, the share of those is still just a small part of the 
countries inward foreign investments. China's ODIs is still a long way from FDIs into China, 
but it is slowly catching up. Already in 2011 the outbound investment was equal to 69% of 
inbound, A Capital said, up from 59% in the year of 2010. The ODIs are supposed to be equal 
to the FDIs within the next three years (http://online.wsj.com). 
 
 
 Figure 1 – Chinese total ODI, 2002-2010 
 
 Source: MOFCOM, 2010 
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The Chinese ODI´s are still related to political objectives where a large share of these 
investments is still today made by state owned firms. In 2006, 82% of China’s non-financial 
ODI was made by state-owned enterprises (Yeung and Liu, 2008).  Those private firms that 
invest overseas need governmental approval for its investments.  Because of the incentives the 
firms may face when investing in foreign countries they are generally influenced by political 
actions (Cheng and Ma, 2008). As a result of this only two of the thirty largest Chinese ODI 
companies are non-state controlled. Although, many of those firms are listed on a stock 
exchange, the state still remains as a majority power and appoints executives, often from party 
ranks (Morck et al, 2008). This means that their investment decisions reflect political 
objectives, and not just profit maximization as is often the case for privately owned 
multinationals (Cheng and Ma, 2008). 
 
In the past 20 years, China has moved from being East Asia’s largest oil exporter to becoming 
the world’s third largest oil importer in 2008, behind the United States and Japan. Where in 
recent years more and more of people have moved out of poverty, the demand on oil and 
other natural resources like aluminum, copper, nickel, iron ore, and other key commodity 
products has increased significantly. The natural resource-seeking ODI of the Chinese energy 
majors is closely connected with the government’s pursuit of a national energy security plan 
to secure overseas assets and supply agreements (Salidjanova, 2011). 
As mentioned earlier some studies of Chinese ODI suggest that Chinese companies have 
competitive advantages in countries with weak institutions. Chinese firms are, in contrast to 
companies from developed economies, more experienced in handling complex client 
relationships and personal and institutional favors in relatively unclear and difficult business 
environments. They should also be more used to deal with compounded regulations and 
manage to navigate around political constraints (Yeung and Liu, 2008; Morck et al 2008). 
Because of this, many Chinese firms face lesser liability as a foreign investor than firms from 
developed countries. (He and Lyles, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Moreover, Chinese 
firms have less stringent regulation which makes ethically questionable activities such as 
corruption less risky and financially costly. This may also result in a morally less costs in a 
country where such behavior is relatively common. Additionally, extensive personal or ethnic 
networks may serve as a replacement for formal institutions (Tong, 2005; Park and Luo 
2001). These arguments are in line with previous studies that Chinese ODI may be attracted to 
countries with poor institutions. 
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In sum, since China opened up in 1978, the ODI policy has evolved together with other 
economic reform policies. Specifically, the ODI strategy has been transformed from a purely 
political devise to a more market-oriented operation. The group of firms participating in ODI 
in China has expanded from mainly state-owned enterprises to a mix of state-owned and 
privately owned firms. Despite of that, there is still a heavy state involvement in the ODI 
activity. This is at least, what is perceived by the rest of the world. While the absolute 
magnitude of China’s ODI is quite small compared with other sources of FDI, China is 
expected to increase their share of ODI in the nearest future and level up their ODIs compared 
with investments into the country (Cheung & Qian, 2009). 
 
1.2. Investments in EU 
 
The share of Chinese investments within the EU has like in the rest of the world, increased 
rapidly in recent years. Going from around $500 million in 2004 up to $12,26 billion in 2010. 
(Figure 2). The EU is currently the largest foreign investor into the Chinese economy and is 
the Chinese market considered to be more and more important for the future. Just in recent 
years China has been expanding its investment into the EU. Beginning with a very small 
share, Chinese firms and investors are now rapidly increasing their share of investments in 
Europe and this development is set to continue (Gavin, B. (2012)). Although Chinese 
investments are made all across the EU the main focus lies in France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, which had together attracted on average 36.8 per cent of annual Chinese 
investment from 2003 to 2009 (MOFCOM, 2010). Although in recent years the shares of 
Chinese investments into other countries within EU have been increasing. The total list of 
Chinese investments in the EU in the years of 2004-2010 is shown in Appendix A. The 
motives and targets of China’s ODI are changing rapidly as it has become more and more 
driven by China’s economic growth model rather than just political thoughts. The distribution 
of Chinese investment across the EU is an important indication of the ability of Chinese firms 
to invest and of their motivation for investment. Chinese ODIs in the economically developed 
countries within the EU indicate a motivation to obtain technologies and brands as well as a 
degree of capability and competitiveness intrinsic to the firms concerned. On the other hand, 
investments in the less developed economies within the EU have pointed towards low cost 
production that shall target only the European market without upgrading the abilities of the 
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investing Chinese firms (Clegg, J., & Voss, H. (2012)). Many Chinese investors regard 
Europe's current weakness as an opportunity to jump in. Positive effects of the financial crisis 
on the Chinese ODIs include the weakening of foreign competitors’ power, and the market 
value shrink of the assets of many foreign firms, providing the conditions for purchasing 
those foreign assets and companies at lower costs (China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade, (2010)). These Chinese investors that enter Europe are often looking for 
technology, know-how, high-value brands. Many European firms are world leaders in sectors 
like industrial and auto manufacturing as well as sectors concerning both the environment and 
health care (Claus Hecking, (2013)). 
 
Chinese firms identify the EU as a stable investment environment with advanced 
technologies, skilled labour and a transparent legal environment. Chinese investors are seen to 
bring both direct and indirect benefits into the economies they invest in. ODI should provide 
indirect opportunities for local firms in the host country by encouraging better understanding 
of Chinese businesses and how they work. This should also help the local firms to get easier 
access to the Chinese market. The direct benefits are often in the form of employment. 
Another factor the host country can benefit from is the transfer of technology and the 
expatriation of very skilled Chinese workers to the foreign affiliate. This beneficial factor is 
often though related with the investments in developing countries rather than in the developed 
ones. However, uncertainty remains over the managerial ability of Chinese enterprises and the 
extent to which the claimed potential benefits can therefore be achieved. 
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 Figure 2 – Chinese ODI into the EU, 2004-2010 
 
 Source: MOFCOM, 2010 
 
 
The driving force behind Chinese investment in EU is to gain access to foreign markets, 
technologies and factors of production. On top of this open strategy there are certain other 
factors that encourage Chinese firms to invest in foreign markets. They help to explain why 
investing is preferred to exporting or manufacturing sales to foreign investors, and why 
Chinese firms from so many sectors are deciding to invest in so many countries at the same 
time. The decision for Chinese firms to invest in Europe rather than export is sometimes 
precipitated by actual or threatened protectionism in the largest markets. The increased trade 
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well as strong and successful competition within the country of the investment. Also, Chinese 
firms are not used to have the advantage in generation of high technologies and 
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the importance of brands is diminishing but has not totally vanished (Cheng, L. K., & Ma, Z. 
(2010)). 
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The main advantages of investing the EU is thought to be this integrated market and having a 
large currency (Euro). It is also an important that EU have a good regulatory environment. 
The quality of infrastructure, the quality of R&D environment and the existence of attractive 
investment incentives seem also important for Chinese firms when they consider to invest in 
the EU. The perception of Chinese firms regarding business costs and tax systems in the EU 
as compared to other developed regions is more mixed. The most promising sectors for 
investing in EU is that Chinese companies mainly choose manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
trade (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, (2010)). 
 
A positive future investment relation between the EU and China is likely to be successful. 
Chinese firms view the EU as an important market that is safe and stable for their ODIs. The 
maintenance of social stability in times of such economic difficulties as the EU is 
experiencing now, further underlines confidence in future investments.  The transparent and 
predictable legal environment within EU countries is positive indication for Chinese 
investors. Other factors that Chinese investments see as an advantage are highly-skilled and 
educated workforce with advanced international management expertise, and the availability of 
advanced and innovative technologies in the EU. Many Chinese firms have indicated that they 
are likely to expand existing investments and invest more and at larger amounts in the future. 
As firms increase investments to acquire technology, skills and brands that will help them 
better compete both domestically and internationally, the increase in investments through 
M&A could be significant. 
 
Countries within the EU are aggressively competing with each other for Chinese investment. 
In some circumstances they may not wish to see greater European cooperation which could 
help Chinese investors because of this competitiveness. European government agencies has 
indicated that any moves to create a united European body to provide information and 
services to Chinese investors and other potential investors, might be negative in terms of 
those EU nations with well-established investment promotion activities in China because it 
undermines their competitive advantages. The EU should seek to manage this and provide the 
resources needed by Chinese investors for the overall improvement of the investment 
environment in Europe. As a result of this, the EU should welcome Chinese investment for 
the economic benefits that it brings and continue to encourage those investments. (European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2013,). 
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The maturity or 84% of all Chinese investment in the EU comes from state owned enterprises. 
Between 2005 and 2010, only three of the main Chinese investors there were not state owned: 
Huawei Technologies, Great Wall Motors and the Midea Group. As most investments are 
made by state owned enterprises, investment decisions in the EU often reflect political 
objectives, not just profit maximization as in the case of privately owned companies 
(Apoteker, T. (2012)). FDI can be seen as an important source of capital and have contributed 
to the amazing economic growth in China. Firms have gained from technology and 
knowledge spillovers, which also have created linkages to the foreign economy. Chinese 
firms have been affected by those factors since opening up their economy and allowing 
foreigners to invest.  
 
As the Chinese ODIs is relatively recent phenomenon in the global economic system, it gives 
a reason to question which impact those Chinese investments have had in Europe. The 
following reasons can explain why this impact has not been as large as one might think 
(European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, (2013)): 
  
 The total share of Chinese investments made into the EU are relatively small as well 
as most of the investments has been made very recently. 
 Many acquisitions have not yet been successful in restoring weakly driven European 
firms to health. 
 Most the investments are not made in labour intensive sectors where the impact on 
employment can be anticipated in the host country.  
 Finally, European firms have already in some sectors transferred a large share of 
production to China.  
  
Although the Chinese investments still have relatively small impact on the EU those 
investments are thought to have a significant affects on the EU economic development. 
Factors affecting the EU with Chinese investments can be seen as following (European Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China, (2013)): 
 
 The industrial restructuring in Europe can develop if production of maturing industries 
is transferred to China. 
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 The access for European firms to the Chinese will be greater as well as the connection 
to other emerging markets through with Chinese MNEs. 
 Chinese firms pay premium prices for Western technologies embodied within 
European firms that should result in higher returns for European investment in R&D. 
 The resuscitation of some European firms that are going though difficulties. 
 This may give European firms to discharge underperforming assets profitably. 
 Chinese investments bring much needed capital into the EU banking sector. 
 
While Chinese investments into the EU can both been seen as a risk as well as an challenge 
the meaning for those investments can have an significant affects to the European economy 
and supported the development of the EU (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 
(2013)): 
  
 Within certain sectors, Chinese investors represent a true competitive threat to 
European firms, especially as they become more adept at managing brands and 
adapting to European tastes. 
 Corporate governance among Chinese firms is often weak. This is in form of lack of 
transparency, poor accountability and close ties with the government. 
 Hierarchical and inflexible management techniques in some Chinese firms can 
sometimes lead to instability within the employees. 
 The support Chinese state owned enterprises receive may lead to unfair competition 
for European rivals. 
 The opportunities for European firms to acquire Chinese firms are not always the 
same as those that Chinese investors often do in Europe.   
 The security concerns arise from the possible outflow of critical European high 
technologies to China. 
 
It seems that Chinese investors have a lot of opportunities in countries within the EU. A 
number of indications are probable why those investors to enter EU. As Chinese firms are 
increasing their influence on the financial environment in Europe it is interesting to see what 
it is that determines Chinese investors to enter EU.  
 
14 | P a g e  
 
2. Theoretical framework  
FDI take place when a foreign firm purchases the assets of a firm in the host country, for 
example through a merger or acquisition, or when a foreign firm builds a new production 
plant abroad which is known as Greenfield investments. These foreign investments are 
determined by the real decisions of the managers of multinational corporations (MNCs) who 
devise their international investment strategy as a means of expanding their international 
operating situation. (Nicolas, F., & Thomsen, S. (2008)). FDI are defined by the UNCTAD as 
followed: “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy 
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other 
than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign 
affiliate). Foreign direct investment implies that the investor exerts a significant degree of 
influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy. Such 
investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent 
transactions between them and among foreign affiliates, both incorporated and 
unincorporated” (UNCTAD 1998: 350).  
 
Economic growth and development, job creation and technology transfer are often associated 
as positive effects of FDI (Jenkins & Thomas 2002). The determining factors of FDI are a 
complex problem to identify which depends on several characteristics specific for each 
country, sectors and companies. 
2.1. General ODI theory 
 
The general principles of the ODI theory are twofold according to Buckley and Casson 
(1976).  
 
 Firms internalize missing or imperfect external markets until the costs of further 
internalization outweigh the benefits. 
 Firms choose locations for their investment activities that minimize the overall costs 
of their business operations.  
 
In his location aspect of the mainstream or general ODI theory, Dunning (1977), suggests 
three primary motivations for a countries outward investment. These three aspects are: 
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resource seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking ODIs. In the following sections 
these aspects will be introduced. 
 
The general theory of ODI has been built largely on the experience of industrialized country 
investors. While in certain respects this can be readily applied to emerging economy 
investors, there are inevitably gaps. Market seeking ODI will be undertaken by emerging 
economy firms for traditional trade supporting reasons, to access distribution networks, to 
facilitate the exports of domestic producers and to improve exports from the host country to 
other large and rapidly growing markets. Efficiency seeking ODI will occur when outward 
investors seek lower cost locations for operations, particular in the search for lower cost 
labour. Given China’s comparatively low labour cost levels, especially compared with 
Europe, this motivation is unlikely and is not explicitly considered in this study. Increased 
efficiency seeking investments by Chinese firm are rather thought to be focused towards 
technology and production development.   
 
Some studies (Dunning, 2002) have pointed out that the motives for and the determinants of 
ODI have been changing in recent years. According to Dunning (2002), ODI in developing 
countries has been changing from market-seeking and resource-seeking ODI to more 
efficiency-seeking investment decisions. Due to increased competitiveness in global markets, 
firms are concentrating more and more to relocate some of their production facilities in low 
labour developing countries to lower cost of production. Despite of this and in contrast to ODI 
into industrial countries, ODI into the developing countries is still in a large number directed 
towards the natural resources and national or regional markets (Dunning, 2002).  
 
2.2. Resource seeking 
 
According to Buckley et al. (2007) “resource-seeking FDI from emerging economies occurs 
to acquire or secure the supply of raw materials and energy sources in short supply at home.” 
Countries enrichment in natural resource is therefore thought to be a corresponding 
determinant for ODIs. Natural resources has for a long time been the most important 
determinant of ODI. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the share of investments in 
natural resources were around 60%. Since then the share of those investments has been 
declining as other sectors have increased their share (UNCTAD 1998: 106). The investments 
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in developing natural resource rich countries take place when those countries either lacked the 
large amounts of capital required for resource extraction or they do not have the technical 
skills needed to extract or sell those resources to the global market. In addition, the 
infrastructural facilities for sending the raw materials out of the host country and to its 
receiving destination had to be in place or had to be created (UNCTAD 1998: 106). 
 
Resource seeking FDI from emerging economies are thought to acquire and secure the supply 
of raw materials and energy sources when the supply at home market comes short. This can 
involve Chinese ODI in fairly high income countries that have significant energy reserves and 
raw material deposits. This may also involve the search for detailed assets such as R&D 
capacity and output, design facilities as well as brand names that are embedded in high 
developed country firms and that can normally only be accessed by takeover of these firms or 
subdivisions of them (Dunning, 2001).  
 
2.3. Market seeking 
 
The main reason for market-seeking ODI is to enter and take advantage of new markets, 
respectively to sustain or protect those markets (Dunning & Lundan 2008). The advantage for 
Chinese firms to access beneficial markets is an important indicator in this aspect. According 
to Buckley et al. (2007), market seeking ODI from emerging economies are made to access 
distribution networks and to facilitate the exports of home country producers. Additionally, 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) stress that physical presence of the firm plays an increasingly 
important role in global marketing strategies. The corresponding ODI determinant is therefore 
thought to be the market size “in absolute terms as well as in relation to the size and income 
of its population, and market growth” (UNCTAD 1998: 107). 
 
Host market characteristics, such as market size, are generally recognized as a significant 
determinant of ODI. With a host country larger market, opportunities for efficient utilization 
of resources and the gain of economies of scale and scope via ODI can be obtained 
(UNCTAD, 1998). Studies have shown that there is positive relationship between ODI flow 
and market size. Rapidly growing economies should provide more opportunities for 
generating profits than those which are growing more slowly or not at all. This should give 
firms opportunities to invest in those markets to expand their market share (Lim, 1983). 
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2.4. Efficiency seeking 
 
Buckley et al. (2007) characterizes efficiency-seeking ODI when investors seek lower-cost 
locations for operations, in particular in the search for lower labor cost as a determinant of 
investment. Efficiency seeking investments are supposed to restructure the firms existing 
investments so as to achieve an efficient allocation of international economic activity. With 
efficiency seeking investments firms expect to increase their efficiency by exploiting the 
benefits of economies of scale and scope and also those of common ownership.  
Chinese ODI has been directed to the acquisition of information and knowledge on how to 
operate internationally, especially in the 1980s (Buckley, et al., 2006; Zhan, 1995). In recent 
years, an expressed goal of state directed Chinese ODI has been to access advanced 
technology, immobile strategic assets (brands, local distribution networks) and other 
competences in foreign markets (Warner et al., 2004; Deng, 2003; Zhang, 2003), through both 
acquisitions and other financial investments. It is expected that Chinese firms would direct 
such efficiency seeking ODI towards economies with significant levels of human and 
academic capital, in particular towards more industrialized countries, to help them to 
strengthen their competitiveness (Dunning et al., 1998).  
 
2.5. Previous studies 
 
Some empirical evidence on host country determinants of Chinese ODIs are available. As the 
financial presence of China abroad has been increasing, a number of studies have been 
published in recent years on Chinese ODI. Most of these present simple descriptive data on 
Chinese investment and the theoretical arguments followed by them. These studies have used 
a number of relevant variables that are thought to be included in this study. The results from 
those studies are both different and mixed, which may be based on the complexity of these 
Chinese investments as well as some flaws in the data used and their specifications. Now 
some relevant studies will be presented and introduced for theoretical reasons. 
 
Buckley et al (2007) use panel data on approved Chinese FDI to 49 countries, for the period 
1984-2001. The study shows that more Chinese investment are faced towards countries with 
poor institutions (measured by an index of political risk), whereas natural resources 
(measured as the share of ores and metals exports in total merchandise exports) are 
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insignificant. Dividing the sample into two shorter periods, their results show that institutions 
are significant only in the period 1992-2001 and that natural resources show significant 
results towards Chinese FDI in this period. This suggests that these factors (institutions and 
natural resources) have become more important in recent years. This might be following the 
liberalization connected with Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour in 1992. Buckley et al. also 
shows in their study that Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with large GDP, high inflation, 
high exports and imports, and cultural proximity to China. On the other hand, variables like 
patents, exchange rates, distance from China and total FDI as a share of GDP, showed 
insignificant results. 
 
In their study, Cheng and Ma (2008) conduct an analysis on actual Chinese FDI data for 90 
host countries over the period 2003-2006. Panel data estimation is used but the exact method 
is not entirely described in their paper. In their model specification either institutions or 
natural resources are not include. Cheng and Ma find that GDP and cultural closeness as well 
as a common border with China are factors that attract Chinese FDI. Variables that show 
negative connection to Chinese investments are the host countries distance from China and 
landlocked countries. 
 
Cheung and Qian (2008) perform in their study fixed effect estimation on data approved on 
Chinese ODI flows to 31 countries over the period 1991-2005. In their base specification, 
they find that institutions (measured as the host country risk) are insignificant, while natural 
resources (the ratio of fuels, ores and metals exports in total merchandise exports) show 
significant results in attracting Chinese ODI. They find that Chinese ODI is attracted by host 
country GDP and deterred by GDP per capita, but as both these are measured relative to 
Chinese GDP, the interpretation of this is difficult. Additionally they find that low wages 
economies attract Chinese ODI. Cheung and Qian also run their estimation on data on actual 
Chinese ODI for the years 2003-2005, getting just a few significant results, which is not 
unexpected given the shortage of variation. 
 
In sum, previous empirical studies do not give a clear picture of the determinants of Chinese 
ODI to the host countries. The results suggest that countries with poor institutions both attract 
or do not matter for ODI from China, and that the same counts for natural resources. The two 
studies that include both institutions and natural resources as explanatory variables have used 
data on approved rather than actual ODI flows. This may lead to biased results. The only 
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study which uses data on actual ODI flows does not include institutions and natural resources 
as explanatory variables.  
 
2.6. Is China different? 
 
The studies mentioned above suggest that Chinese investors may respond differently to host 
country factors with respect to the countries different strengths. The share of Chinese 
investments within developing countries has been in highly discussed in recent years. Those 
investments are often related to the institutional environment within those economies. 
Theoretical studies argue that good institutions within the host country can reduce risk and 
costs of doing business and increase productivity (Blonigen, 2005), and attract foreign 
investments. Some recent empirical studies of ODIs also document a positive relationship to 
host country institutions (Asiedu, 2006; Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Wei, 2000). While 
natural resources show a locational advantage in the OLI framework of Dunning (1977, 
1993), their impact on ODI has not been much examined empirically. Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) get mixed results for investments in the natural resource of oil, and Asiedu (2006) 
finds resources significant for ODIs into African countries. 
 
Chinese companies that invest abroad are mainly state-owned. In 2006, 82% of China’s non-
financial ODI were made by state-owned enterprises (Yeung and Liu, 2008). Of the thirty 
largest companies that made investments aboard, all except two are state owned, and even 
though most of those firms are listed on a stock exchange, the state retains majority power 
and appoints executives, largely from party members (Morck et al, 2008). The investment 
decisions are therefore often thought to be of a political reasons and not just profit-
maximization as in the case of investments from privately owned firms from other countries. 
These investments may therefore be to promote domestic development (Deng, 2004), ensure 
governmental survival or increase the wealth or status of those in charge (Morck et al, 2008), 
to support Chinese foreign policy, or support the host country development (Yeung and Liu, 
2008). Some studies support that Chinese ODI is becoming more commercial (Cheng and 
Stough, 2008; Hong and Sun, 2006) and that political objectives are likely to become 
relatively more important for Chinese investments than for investments from other countries. 
Even ODI by privately owned Chinese firms may be reflected by political objectives, because 
of the incentives they face when investing abroad (Cheng and Ma, 2008). Chinese ODI can 
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also reflect different opportunities or incentives than ODI from other countries. In particular, 
China has a quite different institutional environment than the major source countries of ODI 
from the developed world. The level of corruption in China is much higher than in other 
major industrialized source countries of ODI. Also, the firms listed in China the stock market 
regulations are relatively weaker than within other countries, and only 15% of Chinese 
overseas listing is in the United States (Hung et al., 2008). A number of studies support that 
home country institutions affect their competitive advantages (Belloc, 2006, Costinot, 2009). 
In terms of ODI, some studies suggest that investment patterns are not just related with good 
or bad institutions, but also similarities between the home and host country institutions. The 
institutional setting in China may thus be an important determinant of the sectors and 
countries Chinese firms may invests in. 
 
 
2.7. Hypothesis 
 
The market seeking ODI from the investing economy is undertaken to access distribution 
networks and to facilitate the exports of the home country producers. The host market 
characteristics, such as market size, are generally recognized as a significant determinant of 
ODI flows. That means that when markets increase in size, so do opportunities for the 
efficient utilisation of resources and the exploitation of economies of scale and scope via 
ODI.  
Chinese investments are made all across the EU the main focus lies in the following three 
countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Although in recent years the shares of 
Chinese investments into other countries within EU have been increasing. This leads to the 
first hypothesis where: 
 
H1: Chinese investments are made in countries with high GDP per capita rater than in those 
countries with lower GDP per capita (Market seeking).  
 
With the demand for natural resources increasing in China, firms have been investing abroad 
to maintain the optimal level of supply at home markets. Chinese firms have been a large 
player in developing countries in Africa and invested in natural resources in order to keep up 
the increased demand in China. As a number of studies have suggested, China invests in 
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resource rich countries to obtain greater security of access to energy and other resources 
(Cheng and Ma, 2008; Morck et al. 2008). Chinese investors are, with increased demand from 
the home market, thought to secure natural resources in developing countries and invest in 
large-scale acquisition activities in developed countries. The security for energy is thought as 
a necessary to maintain a high rate of a countries economic development, where the future of 
the government also depends on this resource. Given experiences of unrest in other countries 
due to shortages or rising prices of energy, this may be viewed as particularly important to 
maintain political control. Given this information the second hypothesis of this study is: 
 
H2: Chinese investments are made in countries with high production level of energy rather 
than in countries that has lower level of energy production (Natural recourses). 
Firms are seeking for more efficiency in terms of restructuring the firms existing investments 
to achieve an efficient allocation of international economic activity. It is expected that 
Chinese firms would direct such efficiency seeking ODI towards economies with significant 
levels of human and academic capital. Economies where the academic capital is high, it is 
thought to support the investing firms to have better access to technology based knowledge 
and increase the firm’s global competitiveness. The discussion about the transfer of 
technology to China has been substantial in recent years. EU investors are still the central role 
of this process as they account for approximately 40% of the total technology transfer into 
China. Much has been mentioned about the growth of China and their catch up with foreign 
firms. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that China is still relatively small actor in the 
global economy for the assembly of final products based on the import of higher value parts 
and components. Chinese investment into the EU is often thought to gain access to foreign 
markets, technologies and factors of production. This leads to the third hypothesis where: 
H3: Chinese investments are made in countries with high level of technology based export 
rather than in countries with lower technological export (Efficiency seeking). 
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3. Method 
China has only published its ODI data in a format that is consistent with the OECD and IMF 
standard since 2003. The data is published in The Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 
The Ministry of Commerce was formed in the spring of 2003 through re-organizing the 
former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation. The relatively short sample 
period makes it difficult to assess the evolution of China’s ODI. 
The approved ODI data is from the Chinese enterprises that are approved by the Chinese 
government. Similar to most data on China, there are concerns about the accuracy of this 
published data. For instance, the approved ODI data are different from the contracted or 
realized ODI data. The investment that does not go through the formal approval process is 
often omitted. In general it is believed that these data understate China’s overseas investment. 
 
While some previous studies have included institutions as an explanatory variable in their 
calculations, this will not be used in this study. Because the study only determinates 
investments within the EU, the role of institutions should not be a relevant factor. Countries 
within the EU work with in the same legal environment, where the security for investments 
should be similar in the different countries. Also, in this study the distance from China is 
excluded. Where the study focuses on countries within the EU, the distance from China is not 
thought to be an important factor for investments, rather the decision itself to invest in the EU. 
 
3.1. Data and model specification 
 
Required data were obtained from different sources and databases. It is conceived that data 
scarcity imposes a severe constraint on analyzing China’s ODI. The data on Chinese ODIs 
has only been published in a format that is consistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) standard 
since 2003. Certain data used for this study is gathered from The Statistical Bulletin of 
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China (MOFCOM). MOFCOM was formed in the spring of 2003 through re-
organizing the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation. Because of this 
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relatively short period of data samples, it can be difficult to evaluate the development of 
China’s ODI (Cheung & Qian, 2009). 
 
The data were also obtained from the different World Bank datasets. The quality of the data 
gained from the World Bank is collected from national statistical agencies, central banks, and 
customs services. These primary data collectors use different methods and conventions that 
are possible to a significant inconsistency over time both within countries as well as across 
them. Delays in reporting data and the use of old surveys as the base for current estimates 
may further compromise the quality of data reported (The World Bank 2011b: 393). Another 
aspect that has to be concerned is that within the data considerable margins of error can occur. 
Also, the usual care must be taken in interpreting the ratios, mainly for the most recent years, 
because figures may be preliminary and subject to revision (The World Bank 2011a: 327). 
 
The bulletin provides data for the 27 countries within the EU. From an econometric 
perspective this is a relatively small number of observations, particularly when the complexity 
of the topic is at this high level as this. One should notice that the reliability of the results 
from the regression should not be overestimated. Models covering relatively small number of 
observations and corresponding significances are generally extremely sensitive and also at 
very great risk of being distorted by possible extreme values. In the model for this study, all 
the variables of the dataset were examined for potential outliers that might affect the results.  
OLS regression model is conducted using the average of Chinese ODI to countries within the 
EU for the period 2004-2010 as the dependent variable. This is consistent with other studies 
of ODI flows, which smooth FDI flows by using period averages. Similarly, the explanatory 
variables will be presented using their average values for the period 2000-2010. 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
Data for the dependent variable – Chinese ODI to the countries within the EU were obtained 
from the 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment by the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. The dataset consists of the total 
outward investments in the period 2004-2010.  All the values are reported in million $US. 
The dependent variable is expressed in a logarithmic form. The variables used for calculations 
are presented with their statistic summary in table 1 below. 
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 Table 1 - Statistic summary for main variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LN ODI 27 3,149 2,215 0,769 7,097 
GDP per capita (PPP) 27 26085,39 17412,61 4299,469 82494,68 
GDP growth 27 2,577 1,242 0,672 4,707 
LN reserves 27 23,303 1,394 19,819 25,597 
LN energy 27 8,93 2,704 -0,665 12,222 
Forest 27 57432,58 72841,8 3 279995 
Technology export 27 15,252 11,486 3,954 56,218 
R & D expenditure 27 1,424 0,925 0,381 3,649 
Inflation 27 3,444 3,18 0,858 17,841 
  
 
Three aspects of the market-seeking motive are captured by the explanatory variables GDP 
per capita, GDP growth, and the total reserves of the host country. These three variables are 
expected to have a positive coefficient under the market seeking strategy as Chinese 
investments are expanding their market share. Data on these variables were collected from the 
World Development Indicators database provided by the World Bank. The variable GDP per 
capita counts for the GDP divided by midyear population. A country GDP is the total sum of 
the gross value added by all resident producers within the economy added with any product 
taxes and minus subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of the production or for reduction and degradation of 
natural resources. The data for GDP per capita is calculated in current U.S. dollars. Annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices is based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2000 $U.S. The variable counting for countries total 
reserves include holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members 
held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. 
The share of gold of these reserves is valued at the end of every year in London prices. The 
data for total reserves is calculated in current U.S. dollars. Because rapidly growing 
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economies should provide more opportunities for generating profits than those which are 
growing more slowly or not at all, the role of GDP growth should be positive in terms of 
investments. Economies that show higher growth in GDP should give firms opportunities to 
expand their market share. 
 
As a proxy for natural resources the host countries energy production and the land of forest 
area is used. The variable for energy production refers to forms of the host countries primary 
energy. This includes petroleum (crude oil, natural gas liquids, and oil from nonconventional 
sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and other derived fuels), and combustible 
renewable and primary electricity, all fuels converted into oil equivalents. To maintain a high 
rate of economic development, the role of energy security is seen as necessary, upon which 
the future of the government also likely depends. Given the experiences of instability in other 
countries because of shortages or rising prices of energy, this situation may also been seen as 
an important factor to maintain political control. The variable forest area is measured by the 
land under natural or planted stands of trees of at least 5 meters in situ, whether productive or 
not, and excludes tree stands in agricultural production systems and trees in urban parks and 
gardens. As the most rapidly growing economy in the world, China will become in the nearest 
future, increasingly more dependent on the global supply of raw materials and energy, and 
have those China’s investments within natural resources been in focus in the world economy. 
There were many reports of billion dollar deals involving oil producing in 2006 and 2007 to 
both African countries as well as other developing countries (Taylor 2009). This impression 
of foreign investment activities in natural resources indeed found support in the ODI statistics, 
which have shown that Chinese investors made investments for around $8.54 billion in 2006 
in mining, quarrying, and petroleum, accounting for 40,4% of Chinas total ODI in that year. 
 
The main variables used for measurement of efficiency-seeking investments are the host 
countries high-technology export and the countries share of research and development 
expenditure. High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in 
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. The 
data for high technology export is calculated in current U.S. dollars. For calculations of the 
efficiency-seeking the variable of expenditures for research and development (R&D) are 
current and capital expenditures on innovative projects undertaken systematically to increase 
knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge 
for new applications. Within the R&D the areas with basic research, applied research, and 
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experimental development are found. Inflation is included into the regression where this is 
commonly used as a measure of macroeconomic stability in host countries. As Chinese 
investors are seeking for increased efficiency the macroeconomic stability should have a 
positive effect on their choice of location. Therefore, the coefficient for inflation is expected 
to be negative as higher inflation results in a less investment willingness.  
 
3.3. Model specification 
 
The theory of ODI and its determinants gives a reason to investigate the motives for Chinese 
investments into the EU. The increased number of Chinese investments within the EU shows 
that Chinese firms are looking for some economic opportunities within the union. The model 
is build with the aspects of the different ODI theories, market seeking, natural resource 
seeking and efficiency seeking, taken into account. The model for the regression in this study 
is supposed to explain the relationship between the Chinese ODIs and factors that might affect 
them. By including relevant variables that are thought to concern the choice of location the 
following model is introduced: 
 
Ln(ODIEU) = α + β1*GDP_cap + β2*GDP_grow+ β3*ln_reserv + β4*ln_energy +β*forest + 
β5*R&D + β6*tech + β7*Infl + εi 
 
OLS estimations is performed using the average of Chinese outward FDI to the host countries 
for the period 2004-2010 as our dependent variable. This is also consistent with other studies 
of FDI flows, which smooth FDI flows by using period averages. The average for the period 
2000-2010 for the explanatory variables will be used. In the following section the results of 
the regression will be presented. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
In Table 2 the main results from the economic analysis are presented, where the annual 
average of Chinese ODI into the EU for the period 2004-2010 are regressed on annual 
averages of the explanatory variables.  
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Table 2 – OLS regression results 
 
 
The results from the regression analysis show that the variables measuring  for the host 
country market size and are significant with Chinese ODI, are the host country GDP per 
capita as well as the GDP growth with 1% respectively 5% significance. Both coefficients are 
positively related to investments. In other words, Chinese ODIs are directed toward countries 
with both large and growing markets. Although the GDP per capita is statistically significant, 
the value of 0,01% is so low that it is difficult to say it is economically significant. On the 
other hand show the results for a country’s GDP growth high economic significance with 
69,8%. This confirms that rapidly growing economies should provide more opportunities for 
Variable Coefficient 
  (standard error) 
GDP per cap. 0,0001 *** 
  (0,00002) 
 GDP growth 0,698 ** 
  (0,309) 
 LN Total reserves 1,199 *** 
  (0,418) 
 LN Energy production 0,166 
   (0,207) 
 Forest area 0,00000596 
 
 
(0,00000458) 
 R & D expendeture -1,256 ** 
  (0,507) 
 High-tech export 0,060 ** 
  (0,028) 
 Infltion 0,126 
   (0,0878) 
 Constant -31,673 *** 
  9,053 
 Observations 27 
 Adj. R
2
 0,7091  
***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10 
  All models estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). 
  The dependent variable is the log of Chinese outward investments  
28 | P a g e  
 
generate profits than economies that are growing more slowly. This should give firms 
opportunities to invest in those markets to expand their market share. The variable for the host 
country total reserves does not give a significant result. These results are in favor of 
Hypothesis 1 (market seeking), and supports that Chinese investments are made in countries 
with high GDP per capita rater than in those countries that have lower GDP per capita. These 
results are in line with previous studies showing that host countries with high GDP per capita 
are attracting Chinese investors. 
 
The results for the natural resources do not show significant results. In other words, the 
Chinese investments into EU are not focused on natural resource seeking in form of energy 
and forestry. This is in line with previous studies that show that Chinese investments toward 
natural resources have mainly been focused to developing countries. With these results the 
second hypothesis (resource seeking) is rejected. The study does not confirm that Chinese 
investments are made in countries with higher level of energy production rather than in 
countries that has lower level of energy production. As some previous studies have pointed 
out, investments focused on natural resources are often mainly directed towards poor 
developing countries. As the countries within the EU are thought to be developed and 
therefore more likely to be able to produce and make use of the natural resources themselves, 
the connection between the Chinese investments and those resources is not significant. 
Both research and development expenditure and high-technology export show significant 
results at 5% level. The results for those variables show both positive and negative values, 
which indicates that Chinese investments are rather faced towards countries that export high-
technology products than the countries focusing on research and development. This is in favor 
of the third hypothesis (efficiency seeking), that Chinese investments are made in countries 
with high level of technology based export rather than in countries with lower technological 
export. There has been much discussion about the transfer of technology to China. EU 
investors are at the forefront of this process as they account for about 40% of total technology 
transfer to China. Much publicity has also been focused on the rise of China and their catch 
up with foreign firms. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that China still remains a 
relatively low value economy for the final production based on the importance of higher value 
parts and components (Moran, 2011). The transfer of technology will be from the foreign 
subsidiary in Europe to the parent company in China. The technology may be acquired in 
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Europe but exploited more profitably in China. This is because domestic firms enjoy 
preferential treatment at their home market where protectionism in the form of non-tariff 
barriers is extensive. Additionally, as the Chinese currency appreciates further relative to the 
Euro in the future, investors will have an additional incentive to acquire European firms to 
satisfy the need for advanced technology. 
Chinese investments into the EU are mainly directed towards both market seeking as well as 
efficiency seeking. Catching up with developed economies requires a fast transformation 
toward higher technology based production and more efficiently driven businesses. Europe 
can therefore been seen as an optimal location for Chinese investments where Europe consist 
of large markets as well as high level of technology based knowledge. Those results confirm 
that Chinese natural resources investments are mainly not focused into Europe. This has also 
been shown in previous studies that investments toward natural resources are primarily made 
in developing economies both in Africa and Latin America.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper set out to explain the determinants of Chinese ODIs into the EU. As the EU is 
currently the largest foreign investor in China and considers the Chinese market to be 
increasingly important for the future, the Chinese investments are still not a large share of 
total investments in EU. Although, in recent years those Chinese investments has been 
expanding at a fast phase. Beginning at a very small base, Chinese investors are now rapidly 
increasing their presence in Europe and this trend is set to continue. The driving force behind 
Chinese investment in Europe seems to be mainly to gain access to foreign markets, 
technologies and factors of production. This support both the market as well as the efficiency 
seeking theories linked with foreign investments. 
 
Chinese investors have in recent years been increasing their share of acquiring assets across a 
broad range of commercial and financial sectors in an increasing number of EU countries. The 
growing number of acquisitions, made by Chinese investors through international financial 
markets and with very little transparency, has caused some concerns regarding the economic 
security in Europe. China protects its own economic security by maintaining strict regulations 
over the countries capital markets and restrictions on European ownership of shares in 
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Chinese companies. Europe needs to address the issues of economic security with regard to 
Chinese investment in the European capital markets.  
 
As investments from China has increased at a high rate in the recent years indicates that the 
economic crises has had some influence on that. Where many countries within the EU are in 
need of capital, foreign investments included Chinese investments are welcomed, that brings 
additional capital into the needed economy. Also, many firms within EU have suffered from 
the crises, which have resulted in increased acquisitions by Chinese firms. These financial 
difficulties faced by many European firms as a result of the economic crisis may provide 
interesting opportunities for Chinese investors. ODI provides an inflow of capital into these 
suffering economies and can have positive effects on the host country’s employment. Also, 
jobs in foreign affiliates are typically better rewarded than similar jobs in domestically owned 
companies. Keeping the EU open to foreign investment shows an international openness from 
the European site. Chinese investments refused by the EU could alternatively be directed to 
competitors that could affect firms within the EU in negative ways. The expansion of Chinese 
investment in Europe is expected to maintain in the nearest future as the China will invest its 
large current account surpluses overseas mainly to satisfy its growing need for high 
technology production in the home market. With Europe’s recovering period from the 
economic crises the opportunities for acquiring a wide range of companies will still be in 
place for Chinese investors. Additionally, the privatization of state owned assets under 
strengthening programs debt suffering countries in the EU should open up further 
opportunities for Chinese investors to enter Europe.  
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1. Appendix A – Chinese investments in EU –$US millions 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Austria 0,7     
            
0,1     
            
4,0     
            
1,2     
            
4,0                    1,6                   2,0                  13,6     
Belgium 
            
1,6     
            
2,3     
            
2,7     
         
34,0     
         
33,3                  56,9              101,0               231,9     
Bulgaria 
            
1,5     
            
3,0     
            
4,7     
            
4,7     
            
4,7                    2,3                 18,6                  39,6     
Cyprus 
              
-       
            
1,1     
            
1,1     
            
1,4     
            
1,4                    1,4                   1,4                    7,6     
Czech Republic 
            
1,1     
            
1,4     
         
14,7     
         
19,6     
         
32,4                  49,3                 52,3               170,9     
Denmark 
         
67,2     
         
96,6     
         
36,5     
         
36,8     
         
38,1                  40,8                 42,5               358,4     
Estonia 
              
-       
            
1,3     
            
1,3     
            
1,3     
            
1,3                    7,5                   7,5                  20,0     
Finland 
              
-       
            
0,9     
            
0,9     
            
0,9     
            
3,6                    9,0                 27,3                  42,7     
France 
         
21,7     
         
33,8     
         
44,9     
       
126,8     
       
167,1               221,0               243,6               859,0     
Germany 
       
129,2     
       
268,4     
       
472,0     
       
845,4     
       
845,5            1 082,2            1 502,3            5 145,0     
Greece 
              
-       
            
0,4     
            
0,4     
            
0,4     
            
1,7                    1,7                   4,2                    8,7     
Hungary 
            
5,4     
            
2,8     
         
53,7     
         
78,2     
         
88,8                  97,4              465,7               791,9     
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Ireland 
            
0,0     
            
0,0     
         
25,3     
         
29,2     
       
107,8               106,8               139,9               409,1     
Italy 
         
20,8     
         
21,6     
         
74,4     
       
127,1     
       
133,6               191,7               223,8               793,1     
Latvia 
            
1,6     
            
1,6     
            
2,3     
            
0,6     
            
0,6                    0,5                   0,5                    7,8     
Lithuania 
              
-       
            
3,9     
            
3,9     
            
3,9     
            
3,9                    3,9                   3,9                  23,6     
Luxembourg 
              
-       
              
-       
              
-       
         
67,0     
       
122,8            2 484,4            5 786,8            8 461,0     
Malta 
            
0,4     
            
1,4     
            
2,0     
            
1,9     
            
4,8                    5,0                   0,2                  15,6     
Netherlands 
            
9,0     
         
15,0     
         
20,4     
       
138,8     
       
234,4               335,9               486,7            1 240,1     
Poland 
            
2,9     
         
12,4     
         
87,2     
         
98,9     
       
109,9               120,3               140,3               571,9     
Portugal 
            
0,2     
              
-       
            
0,2     
            
1,7     
            
1,7                    5,0                 21,4                  30,2     
Romania 
         
31,1     
         
39,4     
         
65,6     
         
72,9     
         
85,7                  93,3              125,0               513,0     
Slovakia 
            
0,1     
            
0,1     
            
0,1     
            
5,1     
            
5,1                    9,4                   9,8                  29,7     
Slovenia 
              
-       
            
0,1     
            
1,4     
            
1,4     
            
1,4                    5,0                   5,0                  14,3     
Spain 
       
127,7     
       
130,1     
       
136,7     
       
142,9     
       
145,0               205,2               247,8            1 135,4     
Sweden 
            
6,4     
         
22,5     
         
20,0     
       
146,9     
       
157,6               111,9            1 479,1            1 944,5     
UK 
       
108,5     
       
108,0     
       
201,9     
       
950,3     
       
837,7            1 028,3            1 358,4     4 592,9     
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7.2. Appendix 2 – Correlation matrix 
 
  
LN ODI 
GDP 
p.cap 
GDP growth LN reserves LN energy 
Forest 
Tech. export R & D expend. Inflation 
LN ODI   1.0000  
       
  
GDP p.cap   0.5377    1.0000  
      
  
GDP growth  -0.2976    -0.4581    1.0000  
     
  
LN reserves   0.4695    -0.1104   -0.4466   1.0000  
    
  
LN energy   0.4528    -0.0176   -0.1734    0.7963    1.0000  
   
  
Forest   0.3072    0.1149    -0.1543   0.4288   0.4073   1.0000  
  
  
R&D expend.   0.4052     0.6243    -0.4669    0.3386    0.3892   0.5811   1.0000  
 
  
Tech. export   0.1087     0.2358   -0.3233    -0.1293    -0.4370   -0.1122    0.1606   1.0000    
Inflation    -0.0571     -0.4192     0.4332    -0.0866    -0.0187    -0.1240    -0.4394   -0.2534   1.0000  
 
